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Abstract
In this paper, learning algorithms are leveraged to
advance power system protection. Advancements in
power system protection have come in different forms
such as the development of new control strategies
and the introduction of a new system architecture
such as a microgrid. In this paper, we propose two
learning schemes to make accurate predictions and
optimal decisions related to power system protection
and microgrid control. First, we present a neural
network approach to learn a classifier that can
predict stable reconnection timings for an islanded
sub-network. Second, we present a learning-based
control scheme for power system protection based on the
policy rollout. In the proposed scheme, we incorporate
online simulation using the commercial PSS/e simulator.
Optimal decisions are obtained in real time to prevent
cascading failures as well as maximize the load served.
We validate our methods with the dynamics simulator
and test cases RTS-96 and Poland.
1. Introduction
As power systems evolve over time, there is great
desire to increase the robustness and reliability of
energy delivery. It is increasingly important to ensure
cascading failures of networks are limited. Such
failures, such as the blackout of 2003 in North America
[1], are well documented and could have been prevented
with smarter controls [2]. Much work on protective
relaying has been performed to mitigate the impacts of
contingencies [3]. Normal discrete components make up
an underlying protection scheme in a network that rely
on a stream of measurements to operate. These relays
trip when their associated thresholds are exceeded.
Strict operation with discrete components may hinder
protection schemes due to potential vulnerabilities in the
grid that lay dormant until a certain contingency exposes
an underlying problem. These problems can lead to an
increased probability of cascading [4]. Further control
of a system can be performed by network operators
that have the ability to perform ‘expert actions.’ Many
strategies focus on load shedding in attempts to bring
voltage levels back to a tolerable range to avoid voltage
collapse [5]. Other methods attempt to break the
network up into self-sufficient islands to mitigate any
propagating failures [6]. Emergency islanding was
seen in the Europe blackout in 2006 in which a single
overhead line trip caused the continent to divide into
three main islands [7].
Networks are normally designed with redundancy to
ensure that the loss of a single component will not have
a significant impact on network operation, this is known
as N − 1 security. Further redundancies may be built in
a system to improve the robustness of the grid, however
may not be economically feasible. Due to this, N − 2
security is not necessarily ensured for a given network.
With the difficulty of obtaining this level of security,
the ability to recover from said events with intelligent
control schemes becomes necessary.
Impacts of outages need not be stressed, however
the ability to guard against full scale blackouts whilst
maximizing the amount of load served is desirable.
From this, we focus on two main avenues when
defending against cascading failures; the first includes
direct improvement of network control in the form of
action selection. This takes the form of preventative
actions available to a network operator, such as direct
load shedding or islanding. When exploring actions,
off-line based approaches have yielded success in the
past in the form of policy-switching [8]. Other
methods that leverage online based solutions, such as
policy rollout, have shown notable improvements on
maximizing end load served whilst guarding against
blackouts [9]. Policy rollout is an online solution that
explores a certain action set and chooses the best action
at a given time [10]. The work seen in [9] makes use
of the COSMIC simulator [11] when leveraging policy
rollout; we use another dynamics simulator, Siemens
PTI PSS/e, to compare the results.
It is clear that directly improving control schemes
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on the network as a whole is a possible solution when
defending against cascading failures. The usage of
intelligent actions may prove to both maximize network
operation and mitigate full scale network outages.
Another potential solution to cascading includes the
creation of a more modular network. The ability to
safely disconnect bad pieces of the network to isolate
problems may prevent cascading failures. This second
avenue to be explored needs further refinement on the
control side as well.
These modular sub-networks are called microgrids
which are comprised of load, generation and possibly
energy storage [12]. Their main benefit is that they are
self-sufficient and capable of operating independently of
main grid support. Microgrids continue to be seen as a
solution to current problems in our grid and are even
being deployed by utilities [13]. With sub-networks
having the ability to potentially separate from the main
grid, it is important that we can observe important
aspects of their operating points. With the explosion
of new monitoring techniques, the ability to coordinate
these networks becomes more feasible. PMUs
allow for direct measurement of bus voltages/angles
allowing better monitoring and control techniques to
be developed [14]. Said measurements occur at high
sample rates allowing new control techniques to operate
in near real time [15, 16]. The implementation of
microgrids along with new monitoring and control
will greatly benefit power delivery reliability, mitigate
potential outages, and aid in advancement to a smarter
grid [17]. Unfortunately the integration of microgrids
remains difficult due to the lack of control techniques
during off-nominal operation.
Previous works in literature focus on reconnection
of small microgrids consisting of one point of common
coupling (PCC). Said techniques work with manual
synchronization between the buses connected at the
PCC in terms of voltages, angles, and frequencies
[18, 19, 20]. The ability for smooth reconnection
from synchronization is sought after by implementing
load shedding, generator curtailment, as well as energy
storage [21, 22]. With respect to larger microgrids
with multiple PCCs, it becomes difficult to ensure
synchronization at all points despite the obvious
problem of needing manual changes to the network.
A clear solution for multiple PCC synchronization
is not known and may take much computation
time to determine the stability of reconnection in
a time sensitive situation. In addition, sub-optimal
measurement locations create problems pertaining
regular threshold solutions.
Due to the difficulties associated with creating a
verbatim rule for reconnection other avenues must be
explored [23]. With the advancements in Artificial
Intelligence, we make use of neural networks to aid
in producing a solution to classifying stability in a
large domain of unexplored states. Many power
system solutions have made use of Artificial Intelligence
successfully [24, 25, 26, 27].
We draw upon previous work that predicts the
stability of network reconnection with limited PMU
measurements using Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
[28]. To improve upon this work we use a neural
network when building a classifier. The benefit of
a neural network over SVM is mainly seen in easier
training. A neural network is straightforward to build
whereas SVMs may require difficult pre-processing
potentially involving kernel functions. A neural network
would prove to be an easier form of implementation
of solving said problem. With the proposed technique,
we make use of PMU measurements as an input to
our neural network used to predict if the current state
would lead to a stable or unstable reconnection. It is
important to note that PMUs are not fully prevalent
in power system monitoring at the moment, thus full
observability of the system cannot be assumed. The
proposed scheme needs to be built in a way such that
it accounts for limited PMU measurements [29]. The
usage of electrical distance may be used when selecting
certain PMU locations [30, 31]. Due to this, we pick
PMUs to be located near the PCCs in the test network
used.
PMUs make use of GPS synchronization [32] which
may open up attack platforms for adversaries. A
well planned cyber attack may be designed to hijack a
waveform by changing or shifting time synchronization
which may degrade our classifier’s performance. An
incorrect decision at a key point in time may trigger
cascading problems throughout the network which
remain hidden until undiscovered by failures [3]. To
guard against this, we make use of trustworthy subsets
of PMUs in the face of potentially compromised PMUs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 briefly formulates the problem. Section 3
introduces the simulator used. Section 4 discusses the
architecture for our proposed solutions. Section 5 shows
the results and Section 6 provides the conclusions.
2. Problem Formulation
We separate our problem into two main tasks. The
first focuses on solving the problem of coordinating a
reconnection between a microgrid and main grid. The
second looks into directly improving network control in
the face of contingencies.
Page 2644
2.1. Microgrid Reconnection
In this section we formulate the prediction for
stability of a microgrid and main grid reconnection in
terms of a learning problem. We propose to make use
of real time data measurements in the form of PMUs to
build our classifier. Said measurements will be used as
the features in our learning problem. When dynamically
predicting the potential stability of a reconnection, we
make use of the current time step of measurements
to create a real-time estimator. The class label will
correspond to the stability of reconnection at a given
time step. As a result, we will have two classes
consisting of ‘stable’ and ‘unstable.’
When learning a classifier, we make use of a
set of training data consisting of a number of input
feature vectors x1, ..., xn and their associated class
labels y1, ..., yn. Each feature vector along with the
corresponding target will be used in our neural network
to learn weights. An output softmax layer is utilized to
associate ‘scores’ to each class in relation to the input
feature vector. The loss will be based on how close we
were to our true target class and back-propagate through
the network to modify the weights for increased future
performance. Upon completion of training, it should be
possible to feed in a new unseen feature vector to the
neural network and estimate the associated class label.
These unseen feature vectors represent the potential
unknown state of our network corresponding to a new
combination of voltages/angles at different observable
buses.
2.2. Network Operation Improvement
We also look into a solution that focuses on directly
controlling the network as a whole in attempts to
minimize the impacts of cascading failures. In the face
of network contingencies, we make use of a policy based
solution to aid in making decisions in real time.
Policy rollout is an attractive solution to network
control due to it’s ability to be performed online. When
tasked with choosing an action, policy rollout may make
use of a model and transition function to explore an
action set and ultimately choose the best action to its
knowledge. Depending on the model and transition
function, an action in a given state may result in a new
state with a given probability. This is best represented
with equation (1) depicting the transition from state s at
time t to state s∗ at time t+ 1.
T (st, at, s
∗
t+1) = P (s
∗
t+1|st, at) (1)
One can overcome the issue of probabilistic
transitions by running several simulations in a
monte-carlo fashion to obtain the average results
of performing a particular action. When a model
does not have stochasticity, the transition becomes
deterministic and eliminates the need to explore a
given action at a state multiple times. We make the
assumption that our network is deterministic which
drastically reduces the time complexity of exploring our
action/state space.
Figure 1. Policy rollout with depth one search.
A control policy is implemented based on acting
greedily according to an estimated action-value function
Q˜pi of a rollout policy pi. This action-value function
refers to ‘how good’ an action is at a given state. As
shown in Figure 1, four actions exist. A depth one
search allows each action to be explored with a baseline
policy being implemented afterwards. As an example,
we explore each of the four possible actions at st, at each
time step thereafter we perform the action ‘Do nothing.’
This ‘Do nothing’ policy means that no external action
is taken by network operators, however the underlying
protection scheme will still operate. We can then act
greedily by selecting the best action in accordance to
equation (2).
pi∗(s) =a∈A Q˜pi(s, a) (2)
It is important to note that Q˜pi(s, a) is the estimated
action-value for a particular action in a unique state. To
clarify, the states in Figure 1 for each action may be
different.
The estimated action-value function, Q˜pi(s, a), can
be found by taking a monte carlo approach. As a result,
we would perform the exploration seen in Figure 1 many
times for each action (necessary if non-deterministic).
We will have many potential trajectories based on
our action selection, this can be denoted as τ =
s0a0s1a1 . . . sH−1aH−1sH . One can see that different
trajectories can be made up of a different string of state
and action sequences. If we denote the total reward of
trajectory τ as R(τ), it will contain each reward r from
each state in the trajectory seen in equation (3). Future
rewards may be weighted less by using the discount
factor β ∈ [0, 1].
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R(τ) =
H∑
i=0
βir(si) (3)
If we are tasked with estimating Q˜pi(s, a), we may
create many trajectories and sample m of them [33]:
Q˜pim(s, a) =
1
nm(a)
nm(a)∑
i=1
R(τai ) (4)
In this case, we find the action-value function for
state s while taking action a. The total reward of the
ith sampled trajectory when taking action a is denoted
by R(τai ). We label the amount of times action a was
taken in m samples as nm(a). After obtaining sufficient
samples, we may choose the best action in accordance
to equation (2).
3. Introducing the Dynamics Simulator
For both problems at hand, it is necessary to
use a dynamics simulator to both acquire data and
perform simulations on networks. We make use of
the commercial simulator PSS/e to perform the needed
tasks.
3.1. Microgrid Reconnection
We first build a dynamic simulation to allow data
acquisition. We made use of the Poland test case
consisting of 2383 buses. The Poland case is made up
of 5 zones, we use zones 1-4 to represent the main grid
while zone 5 represents the microgrid. The microgrid
is innately similar in form to the rest of the network,
however the response between the two networks should
maintain adequate consistency with a fully detailed and
developed microgrid representation [34]. Dynamics
are implemented on said case which consist of salient
machines for the generators, IEEE Type 1 exciters,
and IEEE Type 2 governors. We further this case by
building a protective scheme consisting of over-current
line relays, undervoltage/underfrequency load shedding
relays, and overfrequency/underfrequency machine trip
relays. The addition of dynamics and protection
settings allow an adequate representation of a real world
network.
Upon completion of building the steady state and
dynamic Poland network, it is important to create
different load distributions throughout the case to ensure
diversity among our data. We randomly shuffle our load
data throughout the case along with scaling said load.
Load scaling for both active and reactive power is done
and shown by Eqs. (5) and (6):
Pnew = Pold + θPold, θ ∼ U(−a, b) (5)
Qnew = Qold + γQold, γ ∼ U(−a, b) (6)
We build 24 different operating points with
the aforementioned method. Upon acquiring these
operating points, we further diversify our network case
to create new initial conditions by re-implementing
load scaling at a smaller scale than creating new
operating points. This gives us over 200 different
configurations of our first built network. We then
run our dynamic simulation on each newly created
network. The dynamics simulator perform network
evaluations every 1/120 seconds which will represent
our time step. Our dyamics simulation is performed
by islanding our makeshift microgrid (zone 5) from
the main grid (zones 1-4) at 2 seconds. We specify a
reconnection window between 20-40 seconds in which
we randomly reconnect the microgrid and main grid.
We perform roughly 60 dynamic simulations with
random reconnection times for each network created.
For each simulation, we save voltages/angles of each
PMU for all time points before reconnection. We make
use of the single time point before reconnection for our
stability classifier.
3.1.1 Data Features and Labels/Targets. As
previously stated, we generate our output dynamics
files from different network configurations. Voltages
and angles are embedded within the output file after
simulation and thus a parser is developed to obtain the
data before reconnection. We specify a set of PMUs
that are available to populate our feature set. The PMUs
that lie on the microgrid side are: 127, 171, 165, 126,
186, 166, 174, 167, 178, 2218, 2124, 2249, 2331, 2226,
2234 whereas the PMUs that exist on the main grid
are: 10, 15, 214, 225, 303, 315, 335, 118, 125, 139,
1607, 1761, 128, 140, 141. The entire set of PMUs may
be used or a smaller subset when creating our stability
predictor. We make use of the time step immediately
before reconnection for our stability predictor. The class
label is set to ’stable’ if the network converges after
reconnection and has at least 2370 buses connected and
in service. If the previous criteria are not met, the case
is labeled ‘unstable.’
3.2. Network Operation Improvement
We work with the RTS-96 test case which is
comprised of three identical networks connected to one
another. Dynamic models are included on the generators
in the form of the ‘GENSAL’ salient generator model,
IEEE type 1 exciter and IEEE type 2 governor. The
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other components, include buses, transmission lines,
transformers, and loads. For simulating dynamics we
implement a time step of 1120 seconds specifying how
often the network case state is reevaluated.
Basic protection is implemented in the form
of overcurrent relays on branches and under
voltage/frequency relays on buses. The discrete
protective elements are implemented to alleviate local
stress within the network and protect components.
The addition of this protection scheme will show
the impacts of different contingencies and potential
cascading failures.
The state of the network is comprised of many
different elements that evolve over time. The simulator
keeps track of these as state variables which include
dynamic variables that change at each time step. The
topology of the network is remembered as well which
consists of the status of components such as: lines,
transformers, loads, and generators. In addition the
attached protective relays and their state are saved at
each time point as well.
4. Implementing a Learning Scheme
After laying the groundwork with our simulator, we
now propose the solutions pertaining to each problem.
4.1. Microgrid Reconnection
With regards to the Microgrid Reconnection
problem, we make use of the neural network to learn
how to separate stable vs. unstable cases.
4.1.1. Neural Network Training. Upon running our
simulations, we may now define our data sets and train
our networks. We make use of a basic Neural Network
to create a classifier.
We build a set of examples that consist of
PMU voltage and angle measurements near the
interconnection point and their associated class
(stable/unstable). We separate our full set of examples
into two distinct sets, one to train the network, and the
other to test it. Our train set normally will not have an
equal distribution of classes, thus we use the common
oversampling technique to avoid poor training [35]. It
is important to address the issue of scalability in our
network. We may come across our network that is
operating in an unknown operating point that we have
yet to see/train for. To prove our method can defend
against ill conditioned situations, we train on 18 of the
created distinct operating points and test on the other
6. We create different random distributions of train/test
operating sets to show that results are not confined to a
well separated train/test set of said operating points. We
explore the potential of utilizing smaller subsets from
our available set of PMUs,this is achieved by utilizing
only available features when training/testing a new
network. After training our classifier from a certain set
of PMUs we test on the test set and compare the ground
truth class and the predicted class. Accuracy is recorded
for both classes for a reliable accuracy measurement.
Several configurations of a neural network were built
to test our approach, however a single layer with a
sigmoid or tanh activation function proved to work the
best. We utilized different numbers of hidden units to
test the network as well and settled on 100. The sigmoid
activation function for the hidden layer was connected
to a softmax layer to create the classifier. It is important
to address that the main modifications to a neural
network include: Number of hidden nodes, hidden
layers, activations functions, output loss function. The
problem at hand is not limited to a unique setup of the
aforementioned modifications which implies the ability
to setup an architecture is not difficult and sub-optimal
architectures do not have a large adverse impact.
4.2. Network Operation Improvement
With regards to the Network Operation Improvement
problem, we leverage a policy rollout based approach to
improve network operation.
4.2.1. Application to Network Operation. We use the
algorithm policy rollout in tandem with the dynamics
simulator PSS/e to demonstrate an improved approach
to prevent cascading failures in a network as well as
increase load survivability. We focus on the RTS-96
case with a predefined protection scheme. We attempt
to improve upon the operation of discrete protective
devices and expert based actions.
4.2.2. Baseline Polcies. We leverage similar baseline
policies shown in [9]. These include: Shedding global
load and isolating zones in which contingencies occur.
Due to the difficulty with PSS/e interaction of state
variables and the necessity of adding user defined
models, we did not make use of the ‘hysteretic load
shed‘ or HLS baseline policy.
A key thing to note about these policies is that both
Isolate and ShedGlobal occur with short delay after the
associated contingencies. Similarly, the same delay is
implemented with the policy rollout approach to ensure
no bias occurrs. The remaining protective elements
within the system will continue to operate until the
end of simulation. We make the assumption that the
ability to shed load and disconnect certain branches is
available which in reality may be limited. In practice,
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Table 1. Unseen operating point case accuracies for Poland network with subsets of PMUs
PMU location [bus number] Class 1 accuracy Class 0 accuracy
118, 127, 166, 2249 98.0% 93.3%
139, 165, 2218, 2226 95.5% 90.9%
118, 141, 166, 174, 1607, 2218, 2249, 2331 96.2% 93.5%
118, 139, 167, 178, 214, 315, 335, 2226 96.2% 93.6%
15, 118, 125, 126, 139, 140, 167, 171, 174, 2124, 2218, 2234 93.8% 97.0%
10, 118, 140, 214, 225, 303, 315, 335, 2124, 2218, 2226, 2234 93.3% 95.5%
10, 125, 126, 139, 167, 178, 186, 225, 315, 1607,
2124, 2218, 2226, 2234, 2249, 2331 96.9% 94.4%
118, 125, 126, 139, 165, 171, 174, 186, 214, 303,
335, 1607, 1761, 2218, 2226, 2249 96.9% 94.2%
load shedding or branch disconnection is performed
by opening a circuit breaker. These devices may
not always be located in the necessary configuration,
however similar performance should occur.
4.2.3. Available Actions for Policy Rollout. The
available actions within our network include both load
shedding and islanding. Due to policy rollout being an
online method, it is important that the amount of actions
is not so great that exploration becomes infeasible. If
we allowed load shedding at all available locations
concurrently we would come to an action space of the
size O(2b). Due to this we use three expert actions that
are also drawn from [9]:
ShedZone(z, p): Shed a proportion of p ∈ [0, 1]
of all loads within zone z.
ShedGloabl(p): Shed a proportion of p ∈ [0, 1]
of all loads within the network.
Island(z): Island zone z from all other zones in
the network.
This action space abstraction becomes more
necessary as the network scales. Computing power
also may impact how an action space is chosen as
more power may correspond to the ability to make less
abstract actions. Similarly, the ability to search the
action space deeper or longer is impacted by available
processing power.
5. Results
5.1. Microgrid Reconnection
For the Poland test case we built 24 different
operating points and different initial conditions for each.
As a result, we obtained roughly over 200 unique
networks stemming from the original one. We ran
around 60 dynamic simulations on each network to
obtain over 10,000 examples for our stability predictor.
We implemented a neural network to achieve our goal
and made use of several subsets of PMUs to prove that
a small set of PMUs may still be used to acquire high
confidence when making predictions. Table 1 shows
the accuracies between Class 1 (stable) and Class 0
(unstable) for different configurations of PMUs. It is
important to note that it is possible to achieve high
accuracies even with a reduced set of PMUs boding well
for future applications with limited PMU placement.
As stated previously, the network was trained on a
limited set of operating points and tested on a group of
unknown operating points. The high accuracy observed
on unknown operating points is a welcome result as it
addresses the concern of making predictions on large
networks with many unique states difficult to train for.
It is also worth mentioning that the accuracies shown
correspond to equal weights associated to each class
meaning neither class is given preference over the other
during training. This shows the most general form of the
classifier in which the operator may want to reconnect
the subnetwork as soon as possible, however is still
weary of instability.
5.2. Network Operation Improvement
When simulating the RTS-96 case, we do not
account for stochasticity. We leverage the baseline
policies to get a sense of how well our network can
survive during certain N − 2 contingencies with expert
actions. For all possible N − 2 contingencies, we first
perform the simulation with no expert control. We then
take a little over 400 of the worst performing cases,
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with respect to load survival, and perform the given
policies to demonstrate the increased performance. The
global load shed action sheds 10% of the load at all
shunts and the zone isolation works by disconnecting
any tie line that connects a bus to a zone in which a
contingency occurs. We also allow no expert action
to take place and let only the protection scheme on
the network operate. It is important to note that this
baseline protection scheme exists for all policies. When
testing the policy rollout algorithm we made use of the
available actions: ShedZone(z,0.1), ShedGlobal(0.1),
and Island(z) which allows shedding 10% of all shunts
in the network, or in a given zone, as well as islanding
any zone.
Figure 2. RTS-96 total load survivability with
different policies.
Figure 3. RTS-96 end load survivability with
different policies.
When referencing Figs. 2, 3 one should note that the
box represents the interquartile range (IQR), bounded by
the first and third quartile. Anything outside of 1.5∗IQR,
shown by the whiskers, is labeled as an outlier. In Figure
2 we see the total survivability of the RTS-96 case. This
means we account for the loading at each time point and
add up the total amount of load served over the entire
duration of the simulation. Conversely, we look only at
the end load served in Figure 3 to account for how much
of the case has survived to the end. Both results from
either metric look similar.
An interesting result to observe in Figs. 2, 3 is that it
is possible to perform no expert actions and still obtain
good network operation. This relies heavily on how well
the protection in the scheme is configured. As seen,
the protection scheme allows the case to survive many
N − 2 contingencies. The GlobalShed policy performs
worst as it seems to shed unnecessary amounts of load
to protect the case. The ShedZone performs relatively
well, most likely due to the configuration of the RTS-96
case. Depending on the locations of contingencies, it
is possible that the baseline protection automatically
separates the network into the best islands. The policy
rollout case seems to perform the best in which it can
allow a higher average surviving load. To further discuss
this point, the outliers seen in policy rollout are much
more acceptable than in the other policies; for instance,
when only the underlying protection scheme is used we
can observe many cases that perform substantially worse
than policy rollout.
With the cases evaluated, it can be seen that the
policy rollout approach does seem to perform better
that the other potential policies. Further evaluation
is necessary for more extreme contingencies. The
implementation of stochasticity is also important to
check in the future as it will have an impact on the
amount of time necessary to evaluate actions.
6. Conclusion
This paper introduces two main solutions to
cascading failures in power systems. We discuss a
novel approach to solving the problem of reconnecting
microgrids. With the rollout of microgrids, it is
necessary that control schemes guard against poor
reconnection of microgrids. It is apparent the benefits
that microgrids will contribute in future electrical power
systems. This paper focuses, in part, on increasing the
resiliency in their operation. It is shown that accuracies
of around 90% can be obtained when reconnecting a
microgrid, even in states of unknown operation.
We strengthen our contribution by exploring
smarter controls on a network for blackout mitigation.
Policy rollout was performed to demonstrate
better performance when networks are posed with
contingencies. The method can be performed online
to explore a set of possible actions to ensure the best
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series of control actions are performed. Blackouts
were mitigated with this technique, however we also
demonstrate increased network performance pertaining
to load served.
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